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The single European currency is not only a technical matter facilitating economic
exchanges but also a political symbol with relevance to citizens’ everyday lives: “A currency
produces global values of a society and at the same time is its expression”2. As Murray
Edelman noted, political symbols – such as flags or political terms like “unemployment” –
are icons of mass culture that involve language and rituals, touch the experiences of
people, and carry “a range of diverse, often conflicting meanings that are integral aspects
of specific material and social situations”3. In this respect, national currencies have come
to represent a multitude of everyday lives’ frustrations and expectations. For instance in
reference to  the German Mark, Jürgen Habermas has used “DM-nationalism” as a term to
describe how Germans of the Federal Republic in the aftermath of World War II have
replaced obsolete national pride with a “substitute consciousness” based on their
“libidinous occupation” of the Deutsche Mark4. Embodying ideas of stability and well-
being, the Mark has infused Germans with a sense of security and trust, much in contrast
to the former Reichsmark or a currency, such as the Italian Lira, which is seen as unstable
and weak.
In the dynamics of European integration, the  project founded on the Maastricht
Treaty to launch the euro as the single currency of 12 member states in 2002 will certainly
mark the  most visible threshold toward an “ever closer Union”, so far. However, although
it is certain that from that year on, citizens in the “eurozone”5 will use the euro on a daily
basis, it is less certain whether it will become a political symbol of European union, or will
enhance European consciousness, a European identity and solidarity, as some of the most
ambitious supporters of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) hope6.
We might expect difficulties in materialising such visions for several reasons. First, the
launch of the single currency occurs in the aftermath of Maastricht,  when the “permissive
consensus” of mass publics support for elite driven supranational integration policies has
                                                                
1 To be published in: Bo Strath/Lars Magnusson, eds., From the Werner Plan to  European Monetary Union: Towards a
Political Economy for Europe; Brussels et al. Peter Lang, 2001. My thanks for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this
chapter go to Bo Strath and the members of the project group at the European University Institute, Florence, especially to
Amy Verdun and Barbara MacLennon; as well as to Sid Tarrow, Norbert Reich, Antje Wiener, Uwe Puetter, and Milena
Sunnus.
2 European Commission, “Working Group on the Euro” no year, p.  3
3 Murray Edelman, 1988, p. 8
4 Jürgen Habermas, DIE ZEIT, 30.3.1990
5  Greece, the 12th euro-member joined in January 2001.
6 The Euro-MP Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Olivier Duhamel (1998) see the euro as a common measure, common instrument
and political symbol for a European consciousness, a European identity and political union; cf. Cohn-Bendit/Duhamel
1998, pp. 96; 165; 257.
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deeply eroded in EU-member states. 7 Second, the legitimacy of the EMU is contested on
most different principles and norms, from scepticism about abandoning a stable national
currency to opposition against building the European Union around a Central Bank8.
And, ultimately, even many of those political analysts and elites supporting the single
currency, rationalise it through the lens of “European nationalisms”, taking for granted,
hence, the conception of the EU as a political space fragmented by national identities,
where citizens hardly communicate across national borders, rarely understand their
neighbour’s languages, differ in their memories of the past, and diverge on norms and
values they hold. The dilemma is obvious: how could, under these conditions of diverging
norms and values, the euro ever become a symbol of  European unity, let alone a European
identity? As Amy Verdun and Thomas Christiansen argued, the EMU suffers from
“dilemmas of legitimacy” insofar as it “rests on the creation of a set of powerful
institutions with direct and executive authority in an area of policy-making…”, while their
establishment “precedes the emergence of a political community in which such decisions,
or, more significantly, the procedures for the taking of such decisions, can be grounded.”9
If we adopt a social constructivist perspective to the study of European monetary
integration, crucial aspects of the process of institutionalising EMU-governance are
opened up, namely the role that discourses, communicative interaction and ideas play in
the framing of collective understandings, in the formation of attitudes and behaviour, and
in the transformation of norms that can be considered as constitutive for a political
community.10
Thomas Risse et al. in their comparative analysis of elite political discourses on the euro,
have advanced such an analysis of the social construction of the EMU. They found that
the EMU, despite major drawbacks since 1992, only survived because German, French and
British policy-makers backed it with a “common vision of European integration”, but who,
in order to legitimate the EMU vis-à-vis their electorates, used symbols of national identity
as well as constructions of “European domestic interests” as powerful tools in domestic
discourses. 11  What the authors leave open is how to account for the fragility of public
support and the intense politicisation of the issue of EMU in mass publics. One might
argue that  precisely the frame of “European nationalism”, when  adopted by domestic
pro-EMU elites, might  be conducive to scepticism and opposition against the euro, and,
hence, promote euro-scepticism.12 I will argue that an elite-centred approach, limited to
the domestic level, and excluding mass publics, will miss an important mechanism
involved in the social and political process of constructing the euro.
Adopting social constructivism as an analytical framework allows it to study mass
                                                                
7 Eurobarometer 43, 1995,  p. xi; Niedermayer 1995.
8 Joschka Fischer, Die Tageszeitung, 13.6. 1997.
9 Verdun and Christiansen 2000, p. 162.
10 Christiansen, Jörgensen, Wiener 1999, p. 540ff; see also Jepperson et al. 1996; Risse and Wiener 1999; Checkel 2000;
Kohler-Koch 2000
11 Risse et al., 1999, p. 175ff.
12 “Euro-scepticism” is used here as a sub-specie of  “Euroscepticism”, conceived of to encompass “contingent or qualified
opposition”, as well as “outright and unqualified opposition” to European integration, in the face of “an on-going de facto
process” of integration, promoted at the institutional level by supranational elites, but restricted to the issue of European
monetary unification; see: Taggart, 1998, p. 366.
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public attitudes as an expression of - competing or hegemonic, supranational or domestic
- political discourses. In their discourses, governing elites as well as opposition groups,
frame the euro as a public object in ways to produce meanings, to attract feelings, to be
valued, or to be judged on normative grounds, within or across national boundaries. The
empirical question is then to identify the alternative frames that make the euro either
become a political symbol of European unity, of collective identity, and social solidarity, or
- by contrast - a scapegoat and symbol of European centralism and fraud, forced social and
cultural homogeneity. In order to answer these questions EMU is explored as a contested
public territory of domestic, transnational and supranational struggles about meanings.
The tool-kit used for this study links the quantitative analysis of European public opinion
data to the qualitative analysis of discursive “framing”, both inspired by the
“constructivist turn” in EU-integration studies. While the former is useful for exploring
cross- and intra-national variations in the distribution of preferences in mass public
attitudes, the analysis of discursive frames provides a framework for studying the
construction and change of normatively based attitudes.
In this chapter, I will argue that the complex process of the social construction of EMU
can be better understood if three aspects of this process are taken into consideration.
First, the comparative analysis of public support for EMU should be matched by an
analysis of euro-scepticism; with a particular focus not only on cross-national variation, but
also on inner-national differences. In particular, this involves examining elite-mass
disparities and gender gaps in order to capture domestic differences involved in the
construction of  EMU.
Secondly, quantitative opinion analysis can be best interpreted when linked to the
qualitative study of political discourses about EMU, to explore ideas, feelings, and values
projected on the euro more in-depth.
Third, discourse analysis includes domestic as well as supranational communication, to
better understand resonance and interactions between both levels in the social
construction of EMU.
In my conclusion I will describe the passage into the current stage of European
monetary integration as a unique experiment, because, under the given constraints of the
Euro-polity, the EMU is the most salient European issue so far with the potential to turn
the EU into a sphere of divided publics.
Patterns and dynamics of euro-scepticism (1993-2000)
During the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, one of the
crucial premises on which the “the European would-be polity” had rested, crumbled: the
assumption of mass public “permissive consensus”13. Conventional wisdom since the
beginning of the seventies had been that national leaders could “presumably call upon
whatever reservoirs of support and solidarity exist within their polity to allow discretion to
public authorities in the exercise of their governing responsibilities”14. In this view, public
support for the EC could be conceived as a generalised and “passive condition” for elite
action, and publics did neither impede nor activate “system growth and change” in
European integration15. After 1990,  the “erosion of the permissive consensus”16 became
problematic. First, public support for the EU  decreased by nearly one third. Second, the
new mass public Euroscepticism was marked by a new gender gap17. Third, contentious
movement activists mobilised mass constituencies to vote negatively in a series of
domestic referenda on the EU, namely four times in Denmark (1992, 1993, 1998; 2000),
and once in France (1993), as well as in Austria, Sweden and Finland (1994). This
transformation of mass public attitudes indicated a shift of European integration from a
neo-functionalist or inter-governmental elite driven project to a contested, politicised
process of Europeanization. This shift also affected  the  EMU, given that the single
currency soon turned into a hot issue of public debate in many member states.
In the language of official EMU-documents, member states are classified in two groups:
the “Ins”, consisting of those who fulfilled the convergence criteria and whom the
European Council, at its May 1998 meeting, accepted for the third stage of EMU
beginning on January 1st, 1999; the remaining states which either did not meet the
requirements regarding debt, inflation and budget discipline, were named “Pre-Ins”18.
However, if one substitutes official convergence criteria by indicators for the legitimacy
which EMU enjoys, measured by mass public support for EMU and by euro-scepticism, a
new classification emerges. For this purpose, in the following I will explore three different
aspects affecting the legitimacy of EMU: elite-mass disparities; gender gaps; and the
polarisation of the issue of the euro over time, all of which are covered by Eurobarometer
survey data. 19
                                                                
13 Lindberg and Scheingold 1970.
14 id.,  p. 121, 130.
15 id.,  p. 121.
16 Reif, 1992.
17 Liebert 1997; 1999;  Nelsen and Guth 2000.
18 “Pre-Ins” was the common label for a diversity of member states which did either not fulfil the criteria (e.g.Greece until
2000) or which opted out (e.g. UK), which opted against (e.g. Denmark) or which did not yet opt for joining EMU (e.g.
Sweden).
19 Since 1973, the European Commission mass public opinion surveys in EC/EU member states provide, thus far, the most
valuable source for quantitative comparative data and public opinion analyses on Europe. Since 1993, the item “public
support for the euro“ was included regularly in surveys, such as “Eurobarometer”, “Europinion special”, and the
“Continuous Tracking Service”; a special survey on the EMU was also conducted in 1999.
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Out of touch? EMU views, by top decision makers and publics
Elite-mass disparities in public attitudes toward EMU were explored by a study
conducted by EOS Gallup Europe20 in 1996. Then, in the EU-15, 85 p.c. of top decision
makers supported the single currency compared to only 53 p.c. of the general public.21
Hence, among the 15 member states a gap of 32  p.c. between elites and publics in their
views on EMU was found which varied considerably across member states. On the one
side, the country where elites were most out of touch with mass publics on the issue of
EMU was Germany: here, support scores between elites (90 p.c.) and general publics (40
p.c.) differed by 50 percentage points. On the other side, Italian elites appeared to
represent mass public preferences relatively best: the gap between elites (88 p.c.) and mass
public support (78 p.c.) was only 10 p.c. (see Table 1).
Mass-elite gaps on the issue of the EMU differed in the three most prominently euro-
sceptic member states (Sweden, Denmark and the UK) as well considerably: while a
majority of the Danish elite  (74 p.c.) and of the Swedish elite (64 p.c.) favoured the single
currency, they clearly departed from their general publics with a 38 p.c. and a 37 p.c.
difference, respectively.  By contrast, British top decision makers’ attitudes tended to be
more in touch with mass public preferences: the gap here was only 26 percentage points.
One would assume that top decision makers from industry favoured the EMU more
than any other elite sector across member states. However, this was not at all the case. In
Germany, civil servants were the strongest supporters of the EMU. In Italy, support by
cultural elites was nearly as strong as by industry. Among the member states that did not
join the EMU,  the picture was not less complex. In the UK, civil servants were also the
most in favour of EMU, industry and the media the least. Both, in Sweden and Denmark,
industry was the  most strongly in favour. But while in Sweden, cultural elites were the
protagonists of euro-scepticism, with politicians following at some distance, in Denmark
the reverse was true: here, politicians were much less in favour of the EMU than cultural
elites.22
                                                                
20 EOS Gallup Europe published “The European Union. A View from the Top. Top Decision Makers and the European
Union” and is based on a 1996 survey among 22,729 holders of high office, in five sectors in the 15 member states: elected
political office; civil service; industry; media; cultural and intellectual circles .
21 Eurobarometer surveys on the topic of the EMU are based on the question asked to respondents whether they are for or
against the following statement: “There has to be one single currency, the euro, replacing the (National Currency) and all
other national currencies of the Member States of the European Union”.
22 EOS Gallup Europe 1996, p. 42.
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Table 1: EMU from top and from below, 1996
Member state TDM public Gap
EU 15 85 53 32
Germany 90 40 50
Belgium 98 53 45
Austria 78 34 44
Denmark 74 36 38
Sweden 64 27 37
Finland 68 35 33
Spain 95 62 33
France 90 59 31
Portugal 83 52 31
Luxembourg 93 63 30
Greece 92 64 28
UK 60 34 26
NL 91 66 25
Ireland 89 66 23
Italy 88 78 10
Source: EOS Gallup Europe 1996; p. 40/41.Note: Numbers in  p.c. indicate the proportion of respondents who
indicated to agree with the opinion that there had to be one single currency, the euro, replacing the national
currencies
Women and euro-scepticism
The study of the gender gap in public attitudes toward European integration has
developed traditional approaches to European public opinion analysis by integrating
gender differences into the research design.23 Using Eurobarometer studies from the 1980s
and 1990s, results showed that women’s support of the EU in most EU member states is
lower than men’s; that female Euroscepticism in a number of them is stronger than male
Euroscepticism; that in a few cases these gender gaps have narrowed over time, while in
others they have expanded further24; and it was suggested that gender gaps in public
support were a decisive factor which led the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996/7 to
strengthen gender equality provisions in the Treaty reform.25 The question is whether the
findings of gendered patterns of EU support will also hold for opposition against the
EMU. In the following, I will draw on Eurobarometer analyses to support the claim that
this is the case.
                                                                
23 Liebert 1999; Nelsen and Guth 2000.
24 Although gender gaps in EU-support have tended to diminish over time, in Denmark, Sweden and the UK they have
increased during the past decade (cf. Liebert 1999).
25   id.
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In 1996, the gender gap in public euro-opposition across the EU-15 was at 5 percentage
points. Within four member states, gender disparities were more than only significant: in
Denmark (20 p.c.), in Sweden (13 p.c.), in Finland (11 p.c.) and in the Netherlands (10
p.c.). By contrast, in the UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Italy, gender gaps in opposition
to the EMU were nearly non-existing. Germany-West was the only case, where male was
stronger than female opposition, exceeding it by 6 percentage points (see Table 2).
The special report on “European Public Opinion on the Single Currency” documented
this gender gap in public attitudes towards the euro for 1998: according to this study
more men supported the euro (1998: 65 p.c.) than women (1998: 56 p.c.); and less men
(1998: 27 p.c.) than women (1998: 30 p.c.) opposed it  .26 An examination of Standard
Eurobarometer data from Spring 1996 and Spring 1998 shows that the gender gap had
been increasing by 10 p.c. in this period. In 1998, the sole exception among member
states was Finland and Germany, where male opposition was stronger, and Italy, where
both men and women were at the same level (1998: 6 p.c.) (see Table 2). Between 1998
and 2000, gender gaps in public euro-support increased in most member states, except
Belgium and Greece, further. They remained above 10 p.c. in Denmark, Finland and
Sweden, and they stayed under 10  p.c. in the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and
Portugal, while sometime during the period between 1998-2000 they increased in the UK,
Ireland, Spain, France and even Italy. In this context, Sweden appeared as one of the
most peculiar cases, given that between  1996-1998, the level of public support for the
EMU had significantly grown both among men and women, while gender disparities had
widened further. While Swedish opposition to the euro dropped by 5  p.c., the gender gap
remained at 13  p.c. (see Table 2).
Intra-national divisions of public attitudes toward the EMU, hence, include disparities
between elite views and mass public opinion, on one hand, and gender differences within
the latter camp, on the other. The Report on “Top-Decision-Makers” and the “Special
Report” by the European Commission on Public opinion, are the best data sources
available so far to describe  national patterns of  gender-specific differentiation. and to
examine and explain potential politicisation and conflict from a cross-country comparative
perspective. But both leave many questions open. One of them is, whether member
societies can be classified according to their internal, complex and dynamic patterns of
how gender gaps and elite mass differences combine and vary in relation to support and
opposition of the euro.
Observed variations within member states form clusters which help identify to four
groups: (1) A first group comprises member states where gender differences and elite-mass
divisions are both most pronounced: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Belgium;
(2) a second group those members where disparities in both dimensions are relatively
small: Italy, the UK, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg; (3) a third group where elite-mass
gaps are largest, with gender gaps being minor or absent: Germany and Spain; and finally
(4) a group of member states where gender gaps are significant, but elite-mass disparities
relatively smaller: the Netherlands, France and Portugal.
                                                                
26 See European Commission “European Public Opinion on the Single Currency”, 1999, p. 45-47.
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Table 2: Gender gaps in euro-scepticism, 1996-1998
Member
state
1996
male female
1998
male Female
DEN 55,7 75,1 41,2 50,3
FIN 61,1 72,8 48,9 45,9
SWE 50 63,4 45,1 58,2
UK 59,7 59,8 34,8 37,4
GER-E 47,8 51,3 19,7 18,5
GER-W 54,3 48,8 32,4 30,6
AUS 40,5 47,3 25,9 27,3
EU 35,7 40,9 28,2 35,6
FRA 27,8 35,1 14,7 21,2
BEL 27,2 33,9 23,7 27,4
LUX 27,1 32,1 8,3 12,1
NET 21,6 31,3 9,6 18,6
POR 21,4 27,9 11,1 19,5
GRE 19,6 20,6 14,7 23,4
SPA 20,6 20,6 10,9 15,6
IRE 19,8 17,6 16,9 17,8
ITA 12,3 12 6,3 6,3
Source: EB 49/Spring 1996 and EB 51/Spring 1998 Note: figures in p.c. indicate
the proportion of those male or female respondents  who were against the opinion
there has to be one single currency, the euro, replacing the national currencies.
If  the patterns of public opinion can be classified along these two dimensions, the
question to be addressed in the next section is whether we can also distinguish between
different dynamics of public attitudes towards EMU across member states. If after
Maastricht, mass public opinion on the issue of EMU has left behind its earlier
“permissive consensus”, and if patterns of domestic public opinion fall into such different
clusters, we should also expect differences in the dynamics of how public opinion evolves:
whether there is increasing polarisation or, rather, a trend toward homogeneity.
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Polarisation of public attitudes towards EMU?
Public support increased between 1993 and 2000 from 52 p.c.,  by 8  p.c.. This can be
considered a success for European elites promoting the EMU. However, while support for
the euro remained fragile, euro-sceptic attitudes spread. This was the case not only for
euro-outsiders, but also for a majority of euro-insiders.
First, following the inclusion of the issue of the EMU in regular EB-surveys in 1993, a
cyclical pattern in the dynamics of public acceptance of the euro became evident. While
from 1993 to 1997, the level of support shrank to 47 p.c. after the “Euro-11” had been
officially established,  it rose again to 68 p.c. in 1999. After having moved into the third
phase of introducing the euro, citizens of the euro-zone, while still holding their national
currencies in their hands, apparently turned sceptic again, and support faltered by 10
percentage points (to 58 p.c. in 2000).
Table 3:
Dynamics of public attitudes towards the EMU, 1998-2000
Level of euro-support*
in 2000
      stable or
decreasing
euro-
scepticism*
1998-2000
( p.c.)
increasing
euro-
scepticism*
1998-2000
( p.c.)
Above 50 GRE (0)
BEL (-5)
NET (+13)
FRA (+11)
IRE (+5)
ITA (+8)
POR (+7)
SPA (+5)
EU (+1)
Below 50 p.c. UK (+25)
GER (+20)
AUS (+11)
DEN (+5)
SWE (+3)
FIN (+1)
Source: Own calculations, based on EB 51/1998 and 53/2000.
*) Figures for “support” indicate the proportion of those respondents who agreed with the
opinion that there had to be one single currency, the euro, replacing national currencies;
figures for “euro-scepticism” indicate the proportion of those who were against it.
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Furthermore, EU-members showed quite different constellations of strength between
mass public euro-supporters, on one side, and euro-sceptics, on the other side. In 2000,
euro-supporters enjoyed a majority in nine member states, with Italy (81  p.c.), Belgium
(76  p.c.) and Spain (75  p.c.) leading this camp; in these countries euro-sceptics
commanded no more than between 14  p.c. and 21  p.c. of public support. Euro-sceptics
represented the majority, however, in three member states: in the UK (61  p.c.), Sweden
(54  p.c.) and Denmark (51  p.c.). Finally, in the three remaining member states – in
Austria, Finland and Germany -  neither camp reached a majority, 27 though public
opinion was polarised. Between 1998-2000, only three out of 15 ruling governments were
confronted with stable (e.g. Greece) or even receding (e.g. Belgium) euro-scepticism. In
contrast in the UK and Germany the number  of euro-sceptics increased by 25  p.c. and 20
p.c., respectively.
Concluding, we can say that in six member states the EMU is lacking broad-based
public support. In 2000 this not only applied to three of the four euro-outsiders (i.e. the
UK, Sweden and Denmark) but also to three “euro-11”-members (i.e., Austria, Finland
and Germany). In all of these countries support for the EMU remained under 50 p.c..
Although in some cases the share of sympathisers increased, without exception the
proportion of euro-sceptics grew between 1998 and 2000 (see Table 3). A process of
growing politicisation seems to have started. This is particularly apparent in those member
states where euro-scepticism is on  the  rise, and especially when accompanied by a trend
towards polarisation resulting in a drop of public support for the euro.
During the two years after the official launch of the euro, public attitudes remained
polarised in Denmark, Sweden and Finland; and  divisions became deeper in the UK,
Germany, and Austria. On the other hand, in Italy where mass publics with their
“permissive consensus” on European integration had continuously provided support to
their domestic elites - especially during the hardships of fiscal adjustments under the
convergence criteria discipline -  euro-scepticism grew moderately (by 8 p.c.) only after
1999, while support remained at a high level.
The question is how these complex patterns and diverse trends in public attitudes
towards the EMU can be explained.
                                                                
27 Eurobarometer 53, Spring 2000, p. 46.
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Explaining public euro-scepticism: quantitative evidence
Quantitative opinion analyses have sought to identify the sources of citizens support
for the EMU, by focusing on national interest and identity as well as on domestic gender
differences.
Addressing the issue of national identity and interests, Anderson and Kaltenthaler
suggest that EU monetary policy is more an “issue full of symbolism regarding the future
of the nation-state”, than  an object of individual cost-benefit calculations.28 This
observation holds for most member states, where euro-scepticism is associated not
primarily with cost-benefit calculated expectations, but rather with the expectation to
lose national sovereignty. However, with respect to this general claim, Germany is the most
prominent exception. Following survey data, Germans are highly prone to “material
calculations” and intensely sensitive to the costs of the EMU: for instance, negative
expectations are concerned primarily with economic growth and employment
opportunities.29 To explain this German ideosyncrasy30, an assessment of domestic
impacts of the EMU appears of little help. A comparison of Italy and Germany shows that
with the contrasting levels of euro-scepticism, such differences do not correspond to the
hardships resulting from the strength of state fiscal discipline and restructuring policies in
both cases. In their attempt to correct the “misfit” between Italian public finances and
EMU-requirements, Italian political elites empowered by Maastricht, adopted more
drastic measures of consolidation and expenditure cuts than most other member states,
including Germany31. Contrary to all “rational” expectations, public euro-scepticism in
Italy remained at an extremely low, and euro-support at an extraordinarily high level. The
Italian case suggests therefore to conceive of public attitudes towards the euro not as an
effect of domestic consequences of the EMU, but rather as a facilitating resource for or as
a constraint on government action in response to monetary union. Hence, although
comparative quantitative analysis cannot explain ideosyncrasies, such as of the German or
the Italian cases, it is indispensable to identify them.
The same applies to comparative gender gap studies based on quantitative data.
Quantitative approaches have advanced explanations on the gender gap in EU support by
analysing socio-demographic characteristics, utilitarian motives, political ideology, gender
differentiated values and  the institutional context of the democratic and the welfare
state. In the testing of a large range of such alternative explanations, Nelson and Guth
provide insights into which explanations do not hold to account for women tending to be
more sceptical of European integration than men 32. For one, in the assessments of the
EU, a number of factors indicated by women are different from those indicated by men.
                                                                
28 Christopher J. Anderson and Karl C. Kaltenthaler (1998: 24f.), in an analysis based on EB  42, found that satisfaction with
EU-institutions and materialism explained EMU-support, while national pride, domestic political satisfaction and
postmaterialism explained its lack, and egocentric, self-interest based calculations did not matter.
29 See: Europinion special, January 1999, B34; cf. Also Cautrès and Reynié 2000
30 cf.  Huffschmid 1998.
31 Sbragia 2000.
32 Among these “women specific” factors, with a positive relation to their pro-European attitudes, Nelson and Guth identify
“knowledge about the EU”, “educational resources”, and number of children; while they find “ideology” to work differently
for both genders; Nelsen and Guth 2000, p. 279-282.
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Second, they claim, contrary to traditional or to feminist expectations, that neither
“women’s values”, such as those related to religion,  nor the advantages available to
women through the welfare state they live in are reasons capable of explaining women’s
attitudes towards the EU. Finally third, the authors claim that much of the gender gap
variance is due to “national idiosyncrasies”, and that in order to understand which
national traditions matter, “we need further exploration.”33
In order to understand patterns and dynamics of public opinion involved in the social
construction of the EMU, quantitative approaches to public attitudes are hence
indispensable for identifying contrasting cases. But in the context of the diversity of
domestic economic and social structures and political institutions in EU member states, it
appears dubious whether a single set of causes or motivations can be identified to explain
euro-scepticism and to be generalised across the EU. Quantitative studies based on
culturally unspecific questionnaires conceal the fundamental ambiguities of  diverse
meanings and language terms that are constructed to measure variables. To examine these
ambiguities with their more deep-seated motivational bases, qualitative, language sensitive
studies of the discursive frames used in domestic debates are needed to complement
quantitative analyses.
In the next section, I will adopt such a qualitative approach to explore the patterns
and dynamics of “ideosyncratic” cases more in detail. For this purpose, I will compare
political discourses on the  EMU,  by focusing on the most contrasting cases, identified
above: Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, Italy and the UK. The comparative approach
to political discourses on the EMU in these member states rests on a distinction between
different types of  “frames” for constructing the euro.
Euro-sceptic discourses in the social construction of the EMU
Seen as a process of social construction, the introduction of the single currency into the
fragmented polity of the EU could have been expected to provoke  mass politicisation.
Precisely because of the need to explore “national idiosyncrasies” that show up in the
politicisation processes on the issue of  the EMU, I suggest here to adopt a qualitative,
interpretative framework for examining discursive strategies. This framework is based on a
distinction between different types of cognitive and normative frames that are used in
public discourses. A public discourse is conceived here as “the sum of political actors’
public accounts of the polity’s purposes, goals and ideals, while its function is to explain
political events, to justify political actions, to develop political identities, to reshape and
reinterpret political history, and, all in all, to frame the national political discussion.”34 I
will further distinguish between five types of discursive strategies to frame the domestic
discussion of the EMU: the “Europe-nationalist” frame; the “cultural-nationalist” frame;
                                                                
33   Id., p. 286.
34  Schmidt 1998, p. 3 ff.
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the “social-nationalist” frame; the “euro-constructive” frame; and the “gendered” frame.
These strategies shall be characterised by the particular frames on which they rely and
which are based on more general rhetoric devices: ideas about whether and how the EMU
will impact people’s social practices; ideological constructions of collective identities and
expectations about how these will be affected by the monetary union; and evaluations of
whether the norms on which the EMU is based will collide with certain normative
principles that are taken for granted.
To illustrate these particular discursive strategies and how they  shape frameworks of
meaning for making the EMU intelligible to domestic publics, I will draw on empirical
evidence from member states and illustrate (1) the “Europe-nationalist” framework by
German debates; (2) the “cultural nationalist” by examples from Britain and France; (3)
the “social nationalist framework” by examples from Sweden and Denmark; (4) the “euro-
constructive” framework by French arguments and the (5) “gender framework” by
feminist transnational debates. At the same time, this framework will serve to explore more
in depth the most “ideosyncratic” cases among member states with regard to their
patterns of public attitudes towards the EMU that quantitative analysis has helped to
identify.
The “Europe-nationalist” frame and the German debate
In their attempts to persuade domestic publics that the monetary union and the
ensuing domestic changes are, both, empirically desirable and normatively acceptable,
political elites have built on a variety of ideas, languages and frameworks. Discursive
frameworks that argue for the European Union because of national interests have been
depicted as “Europe-nationalist”, as they emphasise not only the inevitability but also the
necessity of European integration, by claiming that this was in the best national interests:
by serving domestic preferences, and because of being basically shaped by domestic
interests.35 To succeed so convincingly, and to help effectively to change a country’s policy
paradigm, elites must reconstruct the dominant discourse and change its underlying belief
structures, by building at the same time on old understandings, while creating something
new.36
Amy Verdun and Thomas Christiansen have pointed to the dangers of output-oriented
strategies for legitimating the EMU in terms of anticipated positive economic effects of
the single currency.37 In the perspective of self-denominated “Euro-constructivists” (see
below), such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Oliver Duhamel, this strategy is furthermore
handicapped by its Europe-nationalist rhetoric, stressing national interests and
expectations that, in the short or long run, are likely to be frustrated. Thus, Euro-
nationalism can be expected to ultimately feed  into Euroscepticism.
                                                                
35 Cf. Moss and Michie, eds.  2000; on Italy and the UK: Talani 2000.
36 Vivien Schmidt has developed this “dynamic capacity of a discourse to change a country’s policy paradigm”, see Schmidt
1998.
37 Verdun and Christiansen 2000: 178.
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By no way exclusive in that respect,38 the case of the Federal Republic of Germany
illustrates the paradoxical effect of Europe-nationalist frames paradigmatically. In their
attempts to persuade Germans concerned about a weak and inflationary common
currency, Europe-nationalists, had vowed the euro would be “Stark wie die Mark” 39, as
sound as the D-mark, due to two devices: for one, the fiscal and budgetary discipline
imposed by the “Stability and Growth Pact” on “weak currency” countries, and, secondly,
the European Central Bank that would follow the model of the “politically independent”
German Bundesbank.40 Part of this strategic frame was Finance Minister Theo Waigel’s
insisting critique of Italy and other “non-mature” and “less-disciplined” member states.41
Later on, when facing the devaluation of the euro, the Europe-nationalist argumentation
switched to claims about the benefits which even a weak single currency was supposed to
bring to the “export country Germany” as well as to its labour market.42 Paradoxically, this
line of argument would imply that if the euro regained strength again, economic growth
rates would have to be expected to decline, and unemployment to increase again. With
such contradictory arguments in favour of the EMU, German Europe-nationalists
unintendedly fed into Euro-sceptic arguments. The left-wing opposition, in their
interpretation of EMU as an “as much anti-imperialist as imperialist project of a new type”
picked this frame up and criticised EMU (1) of being constrained by insufficient measures
of consolidation; (2) as a substitute for a political union that enhanced EU
interventionism within member states and abroad; (3) because of the “mutual control of
national interests” imposing sanctions on those who in their national interest “allow
themselves too many debts”; and (4) because it was supported by a European Social
Democracy that has abandoned “its image as a spokesman of the Social”43.
The ambiguities of this nationalist pro-euro discourse offered munition to fuel mass
public euro-scepticism in Germany. Paradoxically, this happened after EU member states
had adopted the “stability and growth pact”, under the pressure of the German ministry
of finance and in order to appease German anxieties: between 1998 and 2000, German
euro-scepticism increased by 20  p.c. Among all member peoples, Germans confessed to be
most concerned about the issues of national economic growth and of employment
perspectives.44 Ultimately, following conventional German wisdom, growth as well as
employment would be both negatively correlated with a strong Mark.
                                                                
38 For instance, Jacques Chirac is said to have claimed in public that he constructed Europe “because France could be the best
in doing this”; quoted after Cohn-Bendit and Duhamel 1998, p. 101.
39  German Ministry of Finance: Stark wie die Mark, Bonn, April 1992.
40 Ironically, with this line of argumentation  instances in which the German Bundesbank also compromised were brought to
an end: for example, in 1990 in setting the conversion rate for the East- and West-German currency union, where the
electoral logic of the German party government counted, despite economic concerns, as the ultimate “raison d’etat”. See
Busch 1991. On the other hand, the Economist noted that since 1996 the Mark had turned into the “world’s weakest
currency”, The Economist, April 11, 1998: 25.
41 “The stability of the EMU has to be secured against the failure of some to meet financial prerequisites. For this purpose,
the membership criteria and the institutional safeguards of the Treaty have to be articulated and operationalised…” Press-
communication of the Federal Ministry for Finance, Bonn, 10.11.1995; in: Deutsche Bundesbank, Auszüge, No. 77,
13.11.1995.  I want to thank Uwe Puetter, Belfast University, for these indications.
42 “Zeitpunkte: Das neue Geld. Was uns der Euro bringt”; Zeitmagazin, 2/1998; Christoph Zöpel, “Der schwache Euro ist
gut”, in DIE ZEIT, 14/9/2000.
43 Gegenstandpunkte, 2000, p. 145.
44  Regarding the effects of EMU on economic and job growth, 72 p.c.  and 65 p.c., respectively, held pessimistic views; see
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Thus, European-nationalists as well as euro-critics with their frames have interacted
with a German public already sceptical about the euro. Both constructed high
expectations based on nationally calculated costs and benefits which in one way or
another necessarily had to feed into the fears of negative outcomes. This appears to be a
typical dilemma of a pro-euro-discourse that is constrained by national frames: “Europe is
reduced to a necessity, an unavoidable minimal organisation, …….instead of
communicating it as an ideal, an innovation, or a new horizon”.45
Cultural-nationalist frames, and the French and British EMU-debates
While Europe-nationalist strategies are based on sometimes quite sophisticated
reconstructed frameworks to articulate old domestic and new European frames, cultural-
nationalist frameworks revitalise the full symbolic repertoire of traditional unreconstructed
nationalism. Their creativity is primarily in how they link empirical evidence to perceptions
of threats to national sovereignty, with considerable variations in the level of
dramatisation. On the one extreme, there are more moderate cultural nationalists who
claim that monetary and economic integration would ultimately impose also cultural
homogeneity on EU member states. The euro is, hence, constructed as a symbol for
“unification from above” which would leave no space for heterogeneity, difference and
cultural particularity. On the other extreme, there are cold warriers such as Martin
Feldstein, former foreign advisor to Ronald Reagan, in an article against the euro, who
invented the most threatening scenario of EMU:  “The American Civil War shows that a
formal political Union cannot impede an inner-European war. But even if one cannot
know exactly whether the conflicts (which will derive from the introduction of the euro)
will be conducive to a war, this is a possibility too real to discard it”46.
Cultural essentialists are located  between both extremes.  For instance, French
anthropologist Emanuel Todd predicted at the end of 1998, shortly before the official
launch of the euro, by 2005 the EMU would no longer be able to survive. In his view, the
EMU was based “on the false premise that European societies are similar and their various
components are prone to convergence and harmonisation. It refuses to take into account
the very real and inflexible cultural, traditional, ethical and linguistic differences”;
therefore “...the whole thing will founder, the great myth will be debunked, and we will all
rush back to create our national currencies and economies, the euro will be gone by 2005,
or I eat my hat.”47
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Commission, Special Report, 1999.
45 Cohn-Bendit and Duhamel (1988) pin a large range of such ideals on the horizon of the EMU: the euro as an instrument
for dismantling national borders and as a unique measure advancing social and cultural integration; then, ultimately, as a
symbol of European unification, consciousness and identity ( 1998, p. 101ff.).
46 M. Feldstein: The case against EMU. In: The Economist, June 13th, 1992, p. 19-22; Cohn-Bendit/Duhamel 1998: 160
47 Todd, in The Economist, December 1997, p. 32. In his book “L’illusion economique. Essai sur la stagnation des societies
developpées”, Todd further developed his argument based on national identities: contrary to national socio-cultural
diversities, the Maastricht project with its combination of commercial openness and “monetary mysticism” pursued the aim
of defining “a new, larger and more powerful nation of Europe” and that it was driven by a continental European and
authoritarian strategy of “monetary fusion” from above, as Germany had already experienced it in its economic history
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Following Eurobarometer-data, nationalist frames would have been relatively most
successful in Swedish, British and Danish public debates, where the relatively largest
proportions of mass publics ground their euro-sceptic attitudes on national identities and
the perception that the sovereignty of the nation-state was under threat from the EU.48 A
closer scrutiny of the Swedish as well as of the Danish EMU-debates provides evidence
that a quantitative account conceals profound differences between the discursive frames
used in Nordic debates, and compared to British and French unreconstructed nationalist
discourses. In the Nordic countries, frames are mixed, with ethnic-national identities
being of minor importance, while “social-nationalist” frames can be found up-front.
Social-nationalist frames and the Swedish and Danish EMU debates
To Swedes, who are deeply split on whether or not to join the EMU, the “loss of
national sovereignty” refers to the “Swedish model of society”, and its future in a uniting
Europe. In particular, the “communal vision” of politics is emphasised on which this
model is constructed and which a Swedish trade union newspaper described as the “soul”
of the Social Democratic Party.49 In this sense, Swedish social-nationalist frames rest
essentially on social democratic norms and the complementary fears to lose social and
political rights. A particular topic of Swedish Euroscepticism is the perceived insecurity
deriving from the Single Market and European regulations which allow alcohol and drugs
to sweep over the Swedish border.50
Unlike Sweden, which did not get an official opt-out clause from the EMU and where
the debate has been contained in the party political arena, in Denmark, the issue of EMU
has provoked the most extensive and open public debates in the EU so far. Here,
“nationalist” and “democratic” frames appear to be in competition and at the same time
allied. In the referendum campaign on the EMU, in September 200051, anti-EMU leftist
and right wing forces struggled on contradictory meanings of the “no” which a majority of
Danes had voted for. The Socialist People’s Party, on one hand, interpreted this victory
according to its slogan “No to the euro, enhance the international solidarity”, and, in
alliance with the “group for a Europe of democracies and differences”, called for an
inversion of the trend towards a European federal state, in which the euro would serve as a
motor, and for the launch of a new European debate52. On the other hand, the right wing
populist Danish People’s Party called for a “no’ for the sake of national identity. Euro-
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
several times (Todd 1998: 195-218).
48 Asked why they feared the EMU, 49 p.c. of all respondents across EUmember states pointed to a “loss of national identity”,
in the UK it was  64 p.c. (compared to 30 p.c.??), and in Sweden 54 p.c. (compared to 41 p.c. not), contrasting most with
Italy, where the smallest proportion of respondents (21 p.c.) shared such nationalist concerns, and 67 p.c. did not; see
Eurobarometer Special Report, 1999.
49 Reuters News Service, Swedish Social Democrats split over EMU decision; 7/3/2000
50 id.
51 In the series of six European referenda held in Denmark since 1972, the Government and EU elites lost the last one most
dramatically, against 53.1 p.c. of ‘no’ votes and with a high voter participation of 87.7 p.c.
52 Agence Europe: Hohe Beteiligung beim Referendum über den Euro, Argumente dafür und dagegen; 29/9/2000.
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opponents could build a successful alliance by constructing the euro as a motor for a
“European super state”, built on neo-liberal principles of less state and more market. This
construct was an umbrella that equally served right-wing populists, for their nationalist
and protectionist anti-immigration appeals, and also leftist and feminist forces, as
advocates of the Danish successful model of a welfare state. State investment programmes
since the beginning of the 1990s helped to build a social security net, with low
unemployment, and generous public infrastructures, benefiting especially women and
working parents.  Hence, the idea that a combination of a transfer of state competencies
to Brussels and Frankfort with an increasing number of EU immigrants would undermine
this national system, found much popularity for a nationalist alliance of left as well as
right-wing forces53.
“Euro-constructive” frames and the French EMU debate
“Euro-constructive” frameworks share with “social-nationalist” frameworks a basically
critical approach towards the neo-liberal conception of the EMU. But differing from
principled leftist critiques of the global capitalist economy, they take a pragmatic view and
see opportunities for curing  the shortcomings of a neo-liberal philosophy by
strengthening the social dimension of the EU. Thus, the French Communists have
described their supportive position in favour of the euro as “euroconstructive”: “Precisely
because we are convinced of the necessity of a European Union and of the possibility to
change it through intervention, we define ourselves without complexes as
euroconstructive”.54 More principled leftist euro-sceptics argue, on the one hand, that the
convergence criteria, and namely the 3 p.c. tap on the budget deficit, would undermine
social security systems. On the other hand, the intensification of economic competition is
depicted as a threat to national economies, conducive to the growth of unemployment,
and, as a consequence of labour market flexibilisation, to larger wage disparities. With
respect to the issue of employment, euro-constructivists such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit,  are
sceptical, too. However, instead of rejecting EMU, they rather stress the need for active
employment programmes. Their view is that the effect of the EMU on employment will
vary, depending on sector, member state and region; but that, as a baseline, the
Amsterdam Treaty provision on  the coordination of national employment strategies is
insufficient55.
                                                                
53 Die Tageszeitung, 30/9/2000: 13.
54 Secretary of the PCF, Robert Hue, in L’Humanité, Dec. 15, 1997, cited after Cohn-Bendit/Duhamel 1998: 81.
55 Cohn-Bendit and Duhamel 1998: 27ff.
Gendered frames, the Nordic debate and transnational controversy
“Gendered” discursive frameworks for EMU use “gender” as an explicit analytical
category, and thus depart from the majority of political discourses that rely on implicit
normative assumptions on appropriate or “natural” gender roles. Some authors contend
that all political discourses on the EU and the EMU are gendered, even if not explicitly, as
social practices and institutions within which EMU is embedded are shaped by gender
relations.56 Here, I will limit my analysis to explicitly gendered discourses, only, and, hence,
explore the social construction of the EMU through the lens which feminist analysts have
developed. Depending on the situated knowledge they draw on, their discursive frames
may build on ideas about the impacts of the EMU, regarding gender specific interests and
gender relations. Feminist discourses that import gender into the constructions of EMU
and of the EU, more generally57 may draw on different cognitive frames, ideas and norms,
but they all emphasise differential meanings of EMU for women, men or their relations.
For the Danish case, Chiara Bertone has demonstrated that “gender” since the 1970s
has been a “hidden dimension” in the Danish ECdebate, but that the notion of a
“women’s voting block” against the EU during the 1990s was paralleled by deliberate
attempts to construct a specific women’s perspective; despite deep disagreements on its
contents, these attempts were successful in creating space for gender perspectives in
public debates.58 Although not in all member states such space for women’s publics or
opportunities for women’s groups, activists or scholars exists to the same degree to
participate in domestic EUdebates, in recent years a transnational feminist dialogue has
developed on issues related to the EU.
In domestic and transnational debates about the EU and EMU, feminist and gender
frames have emphasised at least five major ideas. First, labour market liberalisation in the
EU had gender biased unequal effects; and it was questionable whether EU gender
equality policy was capable of correcting them. For instance, Anette Borchorst argued that
EU regulations magnified differences between women: “..the highly monetarist character
of the political and economic union... reinforces a dualism between workers with secure
full-time jobs and workers outside or partly attached to the labour market. This dualism is
heavily structured along gender lines”. 59Second, they have pointed to the more specific
negative effects of EMU policies on Nordic “women friendly” welfare states as well as on
their opportunities for women’s employment and wage equality. In particular, feminist
interpretations of the EMU have emphasised the negative implications of the stability
pact and of the convergence criteria for women, depicting them as driving forces for
national savings packages and welfare retrenchment policies. They point to several critical
facts: that after Sweden’s entry in the EU, women experienced reductions in the level of
parental leave payments from 90 p.c. to 75 p.c. of their income; that the Swedish labour
market is gendered, with women finding work primarily in the public sector; and that
                                                                
56 See Barbara MacLennon’s chapter, in this book.
57 See a discussion in Shaw, 2000.
58 Bertone 1998, p. 108ff.
59 Borchorst 1994, p. 40
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economically vulnerable groups have hence either suffered from income reductions or are
threatened by the expectation of unemployment.60Third, supporters of a critical view of
the EMU as a predominantly market-driven and market expansion project and as a threat
to domestic social welfare systems do not share the same view of the effects of  EU gender
equality policy. The case of unequal pay of a Swedish midwife which was presented in
2000 to the European Court of Justice indicated that women’s economic citizenship even
in a member state with advanced gender equality, such as Sweden, was constrained by
gender segregated labour markets, and, hence, might benefit from EU jurisdiction.61
Others, like Brigitte Young or Susanne Schunter-Kleemann, would admit that the EU did
not exclude measures for combating labour market inequalities between men and women,
but they would insist that these should not be overrated vis-à-vis the progressive
commodification of women. Reflecting the marginality of gender frames in the German
EMU debate, Susanne Schunter-Kleemann argued that equal opportunity policies of the
EU constituted  “a small and relatively insignificant niche, isolated from the 'big power
game' that determines the overall economic and political setting”.62 Sylvia Walby claimed
from a British perspective, on the contrary that vis-à-vis the EMU,  EU laws on equality
should not be undervalued as a means to enhance working women’s rights in the private
as well as the public sector.63Fourth, normative reflections on EMU that are informed by a
gender framework see the EU gender policy approach as fundamentally ambiguous: on
one hand, as too excessively oriented towards the market and women’s employability, and,
on the other hand, as still supporting an outmoded notion of maternalism64. From the
Nordic perspective, “maternity protection” that is the core concern of the 1992-EC-
pregnant workers directive, is seen as “outmoded” and as an indicator of a dominant trend
in the EU toward the male-breadwinner-femalecare-taker model65. The EMU and the
pressure it creates for a social and political union is seen as a motor promoting this trend
towards a social policy harmonisation based on a German type insurance model and not
the Danish model of a tax financed welfare system66. These critical reflections on the
impact of the EU on gender equality indicate that norms of a just and legitimate social
order are still contested across the different gender worlds of the European Union.
Although Northern enlargement in 1995 has made welfare and gender regimes within the
EU more varied than ever before, precisely this diversity is perceived to be under threat by
the EMU. In the aftermath of Maastricht, Anette Borchorst only wondered, whether it
would be the conservative or the liberal welfare regime model that was going to win the
race, at the expense of the social democratic regime.67 The view that  EU law did not
attempt to strengthen the family should be corrected, at least in part, because the EU
                                                                
60 Ingrid Hedström, EU-correspondent of Dagens Nyheter, in an interview conducted by Milena Sunnus, University of
Bremen, in April 2000 in Stockholm; for similar arguments, see Twaddle 1997, p. 189ff. I want to thank Milena Sunnus for
providing me the transcript of her interview.
61 For a critical discussion, see Hobson 2000, p. 85ff.
62 Schunter-Kleemann 1997
63 Young, 2000; Walby, 1999
64 Shaw, 2000
65 Hobson 1999; Shaw 2000.
66 cf. Abrahamson and Borchorst 2000.
67 Borchorst, 1994, p. 38.
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adopted a “parental leave directive” in 1996, and inscribed the principle of “gender
mainstreaming” into the Amsterdam Treaty in 199768. However, Nordic feminists continue
to see EU law as a “logical trap” in which women are caught, given the negative position
of the European Court of Justice regarding domestic affirmative action measures which, by
adopting quotas in favour of women, seek to increase the share of women in certain labour
market sectors.69 It is rather uncertain, hence, whether these ambiguous developments will
encourage euro-sceptical feminists to transform their normative frames and critical ideas,
or whether they will rather enhance nationally situated discourses and the fragmentation
of the  European space.
Finally, only in some instances could more pragmatically gendered frames also be
found, for example in the British debate. Quite unimpressed by more fundamental
feminist concerns, gender sensitive politicians brought “gender-constructive” frames into
the EMU debate. This was done to counter women’s euro-scepticism by responding to
their special practical interests vis-à-vis the EMU. For instance, the British Guardian
reported a “startling gender split on monetary union”70, a few days after the start of the
third phase and the introduction of the EURO in the 11 members of EURO-Land, with
the “Anti-Euros” having a 32-point lead among women, compared to a lead of only 12
points among men. The explanation neither pointed to the popularity of the euro-sceptic
“heroine” Margaret Thatcher, to the conventional wisdom of female conservatism, nor to
“residual monarchism” among British women. Why did British women not like the Euro,
then? The Guardian argued that the failure consisted in not casting the language of the
debate such that women could see the advantages to themselves and their families: far
more women than men fear the Euro would mean higher interest and mortgage rates (47
p.c. of women, 35 p.c. of men) and that it would be bad for the British economy (41 p.c.
to 31 p.c.). Quoting Claire Ward, a Labour MP,  “enthusiasts…bored on about macro-
economics, (while) the assertions of the sceptics have concentrated on the home life of the
British voter and gone largely unchallenged.” By contrast, women needed to show, by the
transparency of the euro, that  “a basket of goods from a British supermarket is more
expensive here than elsewhere”; and that if Brits had the same rates as in euro-countries,
this would mean a 70 p.c. off the average mortgages. A Labour party's former Women's
Officer, having pioneered focus groups before the 1997 elections, reported that “women
responded best to everyday implications”: “A lot of men like to think they understand the
economic “big picture”, even when they don't really, and women want to know what
impact decisions will have on their own accounts at the end of the week”.71 
Compared to the conditions under which the Werner Plan was drafted in 1970,
gendered euro-scepticism indicates that the premises for a paradigm of social rationality
beyond 2002 have changed. Women's labour market activity rates and traditional gender
orders have been transformed since the 1970s, when the Werner Plan was debated. As a
                                                                
68 Gender equality policy in the EU in 2001 includes nine directives, more than one hundred ECJ-decisions, anti-
discrimination principles inscribed into the Amsterdam Treaty, policies for combatting trafficking of women, as well as
“gender mainstreaming” to be generalised to all policies of the EU. Cf. Rossilli 2000; Hantrais 2000.
69 Lundström 1997, pp. 74ff.; Hobson 2000, pp. 85.
70 Guardian, 7.1.1999, p. 6.
71 id.
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consequence, gender questions have taken on new meanings that need to be reflected in
any attempt to renew the connection between the monetary issue of a political economy
and a “Social Europe”. First, from multiple European gender perspectives, “Social Europe”
should not compete with national welfare states, especially in Nordic member states,
where they have institutionalised “women power” and high levels of gender equality72:
neither would a return to the traditional “male breadwinner family” ideology be accepted
in Nordic member states, nor the imposition of an egalitarian “dual breadwinner” norm in
continental Europe. Second, from the perspective of structural long-term mass
unemployment, an exclusive or predominant focus on labour markets by linking social
entitlements to individual achievements in paid employment appears anachronistic; and
from the perspective of gendered notions of justice, the “basic income guarantee” would
also not appear satisfying. Third, recent developments in  EU gender policy have started
to extend the labour market focus towards reconciling work and care for all individuals
with care responsibilities, and without falling back into traditional ideologies of gendered
divisions of labour. This resonates with the ideas which feminist welfare analysts have
developed to re-evaluate, and at the same time to “degender” care, thus enhancing
women’s economic freedom.73  In how far have supranational elites developed frames of
EMU responsive to the issues voiced by the diverese groups of euro-sceptics?
Supranational frames to construct public euro-support
The step-wise introduction of the single currency is arguably the first time in the
history of European integration indicating that more than a European “issue community”
began to emerge. The contours of a European public space became visible at a
progressively accelerating pace.74 At first in 1992, in the campaigns for the first Danish
Maastricht referendum, the euro became salient as a European issue in a single domestic
debate; other domestic publics followed becoming sensitised to the issue at different
points in time. In a second step, in 1995, when faced with acute legitimacy problems of
the EMU75, supranational elites launched the most extensive and costly information and
mass communication campaign ever conducted, since the inception of the EC, to be
extended until - at least - 2002. 76 At a third stage, on January 1st, 1999, when the euro was
officially launched, domestic debates on EMU had synchronised at a cross-national scale.
At a fourth and so far final stage, in September 2000, during the Danish referendum
                                                                
72 Hernes 1987; Borchorst 1999, p. 161ff.
73 Feminist political theorist Joan Tronto has suggested to redesign social citizenship rights such that individual social
entitlements should primarily derive from socially valuable care activities and not (or only in a second place) from earned
income and labour market performances; cf. Hirschmann and Liebert, eds. 2001.
74 Analyses of the transformation of domestic public spaces suggest the emergence of transnational “issue communities”
around European policymaking; see: Klaus Eder 2000.
75 cf. Verdun, 1999, p. 212.
76 These communication and information campaigns were developed to accompany the implementation stage of the EMU
until at least 2002, when national currencies will be substituted by the euro. For that purpose, the Commission contracted
groups of experts to define the conceptual terrain on which euro-campaigns were based; see European Commission, Euro-
Papers, several numbers and years.
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campaign on EMU, transnational communication across the Danish boundaries began to
develop, with media transmissions of Danish debates into other member state publics.77
Despite the embryonic condition of the European public space that is emerging around
the issue of the euro, the paradox of EMU consists in the asymmetries it creates for the
Euro-Polity, as long as EMU lacks a political union, and political unity is not grounded on
democratised institutions.78 Under the conditions of EMU resting on an independent
ECB, and on intergovernmental institutions, such as ECOFIN, with weak competencies
of the European Parliament and the Commission, supranational communication
campaigners were not autonomous. If they would have wanted to bring the EU closer to
its citizens79, they were certainly restrained, on one hand, by national governments as well
as by the ECB. But supranational elites were also dependent, on the other hand, on the
legacy of the peculiar organisational culture of the proper Commission. Different from the
Werner Plan language, in the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty (1989-1991), a
technocratic frame had come to prevail in the crafting of the formal framework for the
EMU, where tripartite Euro-corporatism was abandoned and replaced by a neo-liberal
discourse about the EMU, as a way to institutionalise a liberal market economy and to
cope with global competition80. Michele Cini has shown that under Jacques Santer as
President of the Commission, this discourse of technocracy, elitism, and neo-
functionalism continued to prevail, while its re-articulation and the integration of
accountability, representation, and new government ideas for legitimising EMU proved
quite difficult81. The Commission therefore restrained its role to specifically targeted
actions towards enterprises and the general public. While the main task of reaching the
general public remained a prerogative of member state governments, the Commission
contributed to preparing publics for the euro by measures to stabilise citizen
expectations.82 An analysis of the language which prevails in the Commission’s public
information and communication campaigns on the EMU, and in particular in those
associated with mobilising help for “vulnerable groups”, such as women or the blind,
shows that the technocratic style typical of the Commission’s organisational culture
continued to prevail. A Commission Dossier framed women as “vulnerable groups”, in the
need to know “a variety of things but in particular they need to understand prices and
values of the euro and become acquainted with the look of notes and coins”. These frames
obviously fail to resonate with the gendered patterns of public opinion and the gender
frames which euro-sceptic discourses have articulated. Talking about the “need of
                                                                
77 For instance, the daily “Berliner Zeitung” titled an article that Danes gave “a democratic, no nationalist No” (30/9/2000:6),
while the daily “Süddeutsche Zeitung” calculated “the price of the Danish No” (30/9/2000). For the “Scotsman, the Danish
rejection of the euro was significant for the Scottish political debate” and for “fighting for an alternative vision of Europe”
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women”, responsiveness is suggested. But in order to reassure female publics of the
benefits of the single currency, acquaintance with the look of notes will hardly be
sufficient. By renouncing to a more responsive policy language, as well as to a language
richer of political symbolisms,83 Commission public relations experts forewent appeals that
would have touched the real life world experiences of their target publics. By “out-
sourcing” the task of building public support for the common currency to commercial
agencies, supranational elites could not convert mass public indifference, let alone mass
public Euro-scepticism into more stable support. To the extent to which these
communication campaigns for the Euro were conducted like advertisement spots based on
beliefs that the social construction of the euro could be made from scratch, independently
from cultural, normative and institutional foundations, the symbolic politics of monetary
union did not resonate with euro-sceptic discourse and those constituencies’ concerns
reflected by it.
In contrast with the Commission, the European Parliament developed a more
responsive language, in particular from a gender perspective. In its resolution on the
“Commission Communication on Mainstreaming” in 1998, the EP claimed that “women's
position and situation in society should be taken more into consideration when advancing
policies to support the internal market, and not least policies to support EMU”. All
necessary steps should be taken to ensure that EMU and fiscal consolidation had a
positive impact on equality between women and men. An effort was needed to ensure that
the establishment of a single market that “boosts growth, competitiveness and
employment” is not hampered by inflexibility caused by the entrenched patterns of job
segregation in the labour market. Dedicated measures should be taken to speed up the
desegregation process, in particular promoting diversity and the full use of women's
capacities and potential in management positions and decision making in the public and
private sectors. In view of the demographic changes associated with the ageing of the
population in Europe, the future labour supply would become increasingly important. As
women were increasingly equal, or even better qualified compared to men, this would
increase the pool of qualified labour supply and could enhance the smooth functioning of
the Single Market.84
Hence, despite its limited role in EMU policy, the EP and particularly the Women’s
Rights Committee used its prerogative vis-à-vis the Commission to promote an innovative
policy idea: to apply the procedure of gender impact assessments to all EMU supporting
policies. The principle of “gender mainstreaming” could thus serve as a general
supranational policy device that would not ignore locally specific differences in gender
relations, but rather require systematic comparative research to integrate them into policy
making.
                                                                
83 cf. “Commission Staff Working Paper”; “Euro Made Easy program” etc.
84 COM 1998, 122 final; Rubery/Smith: The future of European Labor supply, European Work and Employment Research
Center, Manchester School of Management, UMIST, Nov. 1997.
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Conclusion and further perspectives
In this chapter, I have described how, after Maastricht and the end of the permissive
consensus, the EMU can be studied as a complex process of social construction, involving
social practices, ideologies and identities and norms. For an analysis of European
monetary integration, I have suggested to distinguish three distinct dimensions that are
involved in this process: patterns and dynamics of public (elite and mass) attitudes
towards the issue of EMU; different types of domestic discourses; and supranational
communication strategies with mass publics and specific “target groups”.
My intention was to demonstrate that the analysis of three dimensions of the
communications involved in the construction of EMU, are a necessary condition for
assessing the legitimacy problems that invest the euro as a political symbol with a
multitude of different and contradictory meanings: from peace to war, from a European
identity to a neo-imperialist project, from social justice and solidarity to domination. In
this framework, one can assess EU communication strategies for building public support,
identify those domestic discourses that resonate with patterns of public attitudes and
behaviours, describe how legitimacy gaps widen or narrow over time, and show how similar
discursive and practical devices function differently in different contexts, depending on
specific cultural and institutional connotations85.
More in particular, three findings shall be highlighted: first, supranational discursive
frames which the Commission employed in its mass public and targeted communication
campaigns on EMU were less responsive and symbolically “thin”, and that this was the
case because they rested, among others, on social psychological premisses developed by a
group of experts that the Commission had contracted.86  Second, it was argued that the
Commission campaigns started in 1999 for targeting “women as a vulnerable group”, can
be expected to have little effect on gender gaps especially in Nordic contexts where
feminist frames prevail in EMU-debates. As the third, and  possibly most important result,
it was emphasized that in view of the multiplicity of diverse euro-sceptic discourses and
despite the relative lack of political responsiveness of supranational communication
campaigners, the issue of the EMU has turned the EU gradually into a sphere of publics
that interact across national boundaries. To explain these dynamics, euro-scepticism,
although an expression of different ideas and collective identities and shaped by
contrasting norms, paradoxically has served as a crucial mechanism in this process: by
stimulating mass public interest in issues linked to EMU and by promoting transnational
communication about these issues. Whether, as a consequence of these interactions,
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sticky domestic norms will change, depends not at least on the further evolution of
dialogical public spheres towards a “Europe of multiple voices”.87
Any attempt to address the dilemma of legitimation of EMU needs to communicatively
integrate euro-scepticism and, for that purpose, would require arenas for communication
and institutionalised channels of access for public constituencies to transmit more actively
and successfully their concerns to EU policy makers. It would require to incorporate into
the “currency of ideas” (Kathleen R. McNamara) that currently promotes EMU also some
ideas relevant to public interests in European civil society. Among these ideas, gender
frames have not yet lost public interest, as some modernisation theorists expected. From
the perspective of gendered euro-scepticisms in the EU, the legitimacy of the EMU would,
hence, not only depend on matching it with a political union but more specifically also on
embedding it in the emerging European public space.
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